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ABSTRACT
In the past decade, research on the dark triad of personality 
(Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) has demon-
strated a strong relationship to a number of socially aversive 
moral judgments such as sacrificial utilitarian decisions in 
moral dilemmas. This study widens the scope of this research 
program and investigates the association between dark triad 
personality traits and anti-natalist views, i.e., views holding that 
procreation is morally wrong. The results of this study indicate 
that the dark triad personality traits of Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy are strongly associated with anti-natalist views. 
Further, depression is found to be both standing indepen-
dently in a relationship with anti-natalist views as well as 
functioning as a mediator in the relationships between 
Machiavellianism/psychopathy and anti-natalist views. This 
pattern was replicated in a follow-up study. These findings 
add to the literature on dark triad personality traits and their 
relationship to moral judgments, suggesting that personality 
and mood play a substantive part in variation in anti-natalist 
views in a lay population.
ARTICLE HISTORY 
Received 13 March 2020  
Accepted 16 June 2021 
KEYWORDS 





moral judgment; moral 
decision-making
1. Introduction
Anti-natalism is the view that procreation is morally wrong. This paper 
presents data on the relationship between the personality traits of the dark 
triad and views on anti-natalism with a focus on a lay population.1 The 
results allow us to identify further situations in which lay moral judgments 
are strongly associated with personality traits, expanding this field of 
research, and providing data that is potentially relevant to both philosophi-
cal theorizing about folk morality and anti-natalism more generally, as well 
as to the understanding of the psychosocial determinants of folk morality 
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more generally. Before we move on to the motivations of this paper, we will 
first outline some of the main arguments in favor of anti-natalism.
Anti-natalism encompasses a family of views that understand the moral 
wrongness of procreation differently; some hold that it is sometimes wrong 
to procreate while others hold more global views. One global anti-natalist 
view of interest has most famously been defended by David Benatar (1997, 
2006), who claims that bringing new beings into existence is an act that is 
always morally wrong. Benatar’s argument relies on two sub-arguments: 
The asymmetry argument and the quality-of-life argument. The asymmetry 
argument draws on the claim that the symmetry that the presence of harm is 
bad and the presence of a benefit good does not hold when it comes to the 
absence of these harms and benefits. That is, Benatar claims, the absence of 
harm is good (despite there being nobody to enjoy this good) while the 
absence of benefit is not bad (except for cases in which there would be 
someone for whom this absence would be a deprivation) (Benatar, 2006, 
p. 30). The quality-of-life argument states, roughly, that “even the best lives 
are not only much worse than people think but also very bad” in general 
(Benatar, 2006, p. 12). Benatar argues that on a number of plausible views 
about the quality of life (e.g. hedonism, desire fulfillment theories, or 
objective list theories), life is bad on all of them. The individual arguments 
for why this is the case would be outside the scope of this paper. Connecting 
the two arguments, as Magnusson points out, the “asymmetry argument 
relies [directly] on the quality of life argument” (Magnusson, 2019, p. 683). 
Together, they imply that there is a duty not to procreate, and that doing so 
is morally wrong.
There are several other distinct foundations for anti-natalism that do not 
rely on variations of this specific reasoning. For example, some argue that 
there is a specific moral challenge present in being brought into a condition 
(i.e., existence) that one had not consented to (cf. Shiffrin, 1999). On such an 
account, the claim is that procreation is wrong (cf. also Singh, 2012, 2018) 
simply because one did not have a chance to consent to it (and thus 
justifiably take on the burdens of life). A further alternative to the initially 
discussed formulation is offered by Harrison (2019), who argues that despite 
the view held by most people that anti-natalism is wrong (and presupposing 
moral particularism), procreation is still wrong because the intuitions 
behind their arguments face less challenges than the converse. That is, pro- 
natalist views are easier explained by other factors such as biological 
mechanisms than their anti-natalist counterparts. Recently, Benatar 
(2020), drawing on Peter Singer’s argument on our duties to those living 
in extreme poverty (Singer, 1972), offers yet another avenue of argumenta-
tion for anti-natalism, though this conclusion, as they themselves point out, 
only concerns the permissibility of procreation in some circumstances and 
is as such smaller in scope than their previous global argument (Benatar, 
2 P. SCHÖNEGGER
2020). The main claim of this approach is that the wealthy ought to use their 
resources to help the poor and sometimes to prevent the poor from pro-
creating while the poor sometimes have a duty not to procreate because of 
the badness of the lives that their children might have were they to be 
brought into this existence. In the same vein, Rulli (2016) suggests 
a middle ground which accepts the anti-natalist conclusion but avoids 
some of its criticism by focusing on the topic of adoption (cf. also 
Friedrich, 2013). On their argument, the focus is put on the duty to adopt, 
a conclusion that is compatible with most anti-natalist positions. Yet 
another different types of anti-natalist claim relies on an environmentalist 
argument, pointing out its potential equivalence to overconsumption (cf. 
MacIver, 2015; Young, 2001). There are numerous additional arguments in 
favor of anti-natalism, though discussing them here at length is outside the 
scope of this paper.2,3,4,5
In this paper, however, ‘anti-natalism’ will be understood to mainly rely 
on Benatar’s account based on the asymmetry argument. This is not to say 
that other approaches are uninteresting or unconvincing; rather that the 
focus of the study is put on one of the central arguments of one of the main 
proponents as opposed to a collection of all potential ways to arrive at an 
anti-natalist position. Moreover, some of the data gathered here may gen-
eralize to other theories of anti-natalism, though need not do so necessarily 
(and whether and how they do is subject to further methodological quali-
fications). Importantly, the focus is put on philosophical anti-natalism as all 
items designed to measure anti-natalism rely on one type of philosophical 
argument or another.
Whether or not anti-natalism is true is an important philosophical ques-
tion that also has direct implications for public discourse. As Metz puts it, 
“anti-natalism is fascinating and important for requiring sophisticated 
reflection on the evaluative question of how to judge the worthwhileness 
of lives and on the normative one of what basic duties entail the creation of 
new lives” (Metz, 2012, p. 2). Whether it is true that we are harming those 
who we bring into existence is an issue of considerable philosophical and 
practical importance. This does not just extend to population ethics, but also 
impacts a vast number of questions in moral and political theory, particu-
larly to those relating to the potentially long future of humanity. Not 
engaging with it properly risks leaving some potentially true theories unex-
plored and more importantly also risks imposing serious harm on a large 
number of future generations if something like anti-natalism is true. This 
makes it an exceedingly important topic to get right and one which appears 
to be not yet settled. It is thus imperative that questions regarding anti- 
natalism are investigated thoroughly from a variety of methodological 
points of view.
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While the academic discourse on anti-natalism had initially been com-
paratively undersized and dismissive relative to its importance in moral 
theorizing (but cf. Aleksandrova-Yankulovska, 2019; Harman, 2009; 
Weinberg, 2016),6 the topic of procreative ethics more generally and the 
questions surrounding anti-natalism have been receiving more attention 
lately (cf., e.g., Bognar, 2019; Brown & Keefer, 2019; Harrison, 2019; Smyth, 
2020). This initial disregard (in both scholarly attention and attitude) might 
have been due to the fact that the claim that procreation is wrong seems 
highly unintuitive to most and would further present, for a vast majority of 
us, a serious challenge to our very own actions; after all, we do not act as if 
our friend’s choice to become pregnant is morally wrong. As such, it would 
be intrinsically interesting to understand how people think about the claims 
made by anti-natalism, and what best explains agreement or disagreement 
with them. Though perhaps often charged unfairly in a dismissive manner, 
it remains scientifically interesting to investigate whether the endorsement 
of such views stands in a relationship to particular personality traits. 
However, no formal research has been conducted into the relationship 
between anti-natalism and personality generally that could explain some 
aspects of this phenomenon and shed light onto some of the potential 
underlying mechanisms of holding anti-natalist views, which could then 
elucidate dynamics of public discourse around this issue.7
This paper offers the first empirical account of said relationship, though 
importantly, the focus of this paper is exclusively on a lay population and 
does not collect data on either professional philosophers or self-proclaimed 
anti-natalists. It is, furthermore, important to acknowledge that this first 
empirical account cannot easily offer direct insight into the truth of anti- 
natalism as inquired into by professional philosophers. The aim of this 
paper is much more modest, namely, to establish a descriptive picture in 
which agreement with anti-natalist arguments and statements (henceforth 
‘anti-natalist views’) in a lay population is analyzed from the perspective of 
mood and personality, while offering an empirical base from which further 
investigations and inferences as to the truth of anti-natalism and folk 
morality can proceed.
Focusing on a lay population only does not mean that these findings 
cannot influence philosophical theorizing about the truth of anti-natalism, 
quite the contrary: Given the methodological restrictions, however, no 
straightforward conclusions can be derived from the picture presented in 
this paper without making a number of potentially controversial assump-
tions, e.g., about the epistemic value of judgments by depressed individuals 
or those high on dark triad personality traits. Providing this argument is 
outside the scope of this paper, though we believe that the data presented 
here might play a role in such an argument.
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However, even results regarding lay views can on their own merits have 
important implications for philosophical theorizing. Over the past decade, 
there has been a considerable amount of research in experimental philoso-
phy, linking individual differences in personality to philosophical views and 
intuitions. While some of these studies were indeed focusing on professional 
philosophers (e.g., Byrd, 2021; Holtzman, 2013; Yaden & Anderson, 2021), 
there has been significant work on lay populations too. For example, Feltz 
and Cokely (2009) found that intuitions about thought experiments were 
associated with personality traits. In a more recent meta-analysis of 25 
studies (eight of which are unpublished), they found a modest but robust 
effect of the personality trait extraversion and compatibilist free will intui-
tions and judgments Feltz & Cokely, (2019). This paper will further con-
tinue in the tradition of identifying personality traits that stand in 
a relationship to philosophical views and judgments in the aim of providing 
a robust account of folk morality that may then be relied upon in further 
philosophical theorizing. Having set up the importance of anti-natalism and 
of this research, we now outline the main motivations for the specifics of the 
research design and the null hypotheses.
First, one might think that anti-natalist views would be especially high in 
individuals with high empathy as concern for the suffering of future gen-
erations might be associated with high empathy.8 However, the central 
motivation for this paper is the quite different claim that anti-natalist 
views might also be especially common in those who hold divergent moral 
views, primarily because anti-natalism is not a widely accepted view in the 
general public. A well-researched personality cluster pertaining to divergent 
moral views generally is the dark triad of personality, a term coined by; 
Paulhus and Williams (2002). It refers to a personality cluster that is 
constituted by the three largely distinct personality traits of 
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. In short, 
Machiavellianism describes characteristics of cynicism toward morality 
and a focus on self-advancement at the cost of others; narcissism is char-
acterized by a “pursuit of gratification from vanity or egotistic admiration of 
one’s own attributes” (Muris et al., 2017, p. 184)9; and psychopathy encom-
passes antisocial behaviors and attitudes, low empathy, and a general sense 
of disinhibition and disregard for standard morality (Cima et al., 2010; 
Megías et al., 2018). Importantly, while narcissism and psychopathy both 
continue to be classified as personality disorders in the DSM-IV-TR 
(Furnham et al., 2013, p. 200), the focus of this study is on subclinical 
populations, i.e., samples drawn from wider society that are typically not 
clinically diagnosed with either narcissism or psychopathy. As such, this 
research focuses on, for example, ‘psychopathic tendencies’ in the general 
population and their relationship to anti-natalist views (again in a lay 
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population) as opposed to studying clinically diagnosed psychopaths’ views 
on anti-natalism.
Past research has shown high levels of intercorrelation between these 
three traits. For example, a recent meta-analysis of 91 papers including 118 
populations and with a total sample size of 42,359 found intercorrelations of 
r = .34 (narcissism and Machiavellianism), r = .38 (narcissism and psycho-
pathy), and r = .58 (Machiavellianism and psychopathy) (Muris et al., 2017, 
p. 188). This suggests that all three traits might be understood as loading 
onto a more general cluster of dark personality that is associated with, 
among other things, lower concerns for morality (Jonason, Strosser et al., 
2015). Moreover, there has been a well-documented gender difference in 
this literature, with men showing higher scores on dark triad scales (Jonason 
et al., 2017; Karandikar et al., 2019). Importantly, dark triad traits have also 
been shown to negatively correlate with high levels of moral development. 
In a twin study design, these individual differences in low levels of moral 
development were shown to be attributable both to genetic and nonshared 
environmental factors (Campbell et al., 2009; cf. also Vernon et al., 2008), 
a result that could not be replicated in those with high levels of moral 
development. To address the concern that some of these findings might be 
culture specific, compare Rogoza et al. (2020) for a cross-cultural analysis of 
the dark triad (including non-WEIRD – i.e., Western, educated, industria-
lized, rich, and democratic – countries).
Over the past decade, research into the relationship between dark triad 
personality and moral decision-making has largely focused on sacrificial 
utilitarian dilemmas pitting deontological and utilitarian solutions to trolley 
style cases against each other, as well as applications of moral foundations 
theory. For example, Bartels and Pizarro (2011) show that those who 
endorse sacrificial utilitarian solutions to a higher degree also scored higher 
on the dark triad personality scales (cf. also Karandikar et al., 2019), 
suggesting that a disregard for common-sense morality might be associated 
with an inclination toward utilitarian judgments. Patil (2015) suggests that 
this might be due to psychopathy’s association with action aversion. 
Further, Djeriouat and Trémolière (2014) found that Harm/Care and 
Honesty/Humility negatively mediated the relationship between the dark 
triad personality traits and utilitarian judgments. Dark triad traits were also 
found to be associated with lower moral concern on all moral foundations 
on the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2013; Jonason, 
Strosser et al., 2015). Additional research has shown that many conservative 
views, e.g., on immigration, abortion, and environmentalism, as well as 
some liberal views, e.g., on abortion, have also been found to be correlated 
with dark triad personality traits across multiple studies (Arvan, 2013a, 
2013b). Overall, this literature suggests that dark triad personality measures 
are predictive of at least some judgments relevant to some areas of morality.
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This study extends this research program on the psychosocial correlates 
of the dark triad of personality and investigates the relationship between 
dark triad personality traits and endorsement of anti-natalist views. The 
main hypothesis of this research is that there is a relationship between dark 
triad personality scores and anti-natalist views. Because anti-natalist views 
appear so fully divergent from standard common-sense morality, investigat-
ing whether dark personality traits stand in a meaningfully strong relation-
ship to one’s agreement with anti-natalist arguments would advance our 
understanding of some uncommon moral views and their relationship to 
personality.10 As the dark triad core (Kajonius et al., 2016) has been shown 
to stand in a strong association to a number of moral judgments that are 
contrary to common-sense morality, one might prima facie also expect 
a relationship like this to be present with anti-natalist views. Given the 
overwhelming preponderance of pro-natalist views in the wider public, 
being more likely to agree with anti-natalist arguments and statements 
would as such fit well into a picture of the those high on dark triad traits. 
Further, failing to see the good in life, perhaps by reduced affective 
empathy11 (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012; Pajevic et al., 2018) and a general anti- 
sociality (with its behavioral first- and second-order effects) may also con-
tribute to a tendency of anti-natalist views.12 
Null Hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between dark triad personality 
traits and anti-natalist views.
Anti-natalist views, due to their life-disaffirming nature might also be 
thought to stand in relation to depressive mood. As has recently been 
shown, there exists a comorbidity between dark triad personality traits 
and depression more generally (Gómez-Leal et al., 2019; cf. also Tokarev 
et al., 2017; Jonason, Baughman et al., 2015). Above and beyond this 
comorbidity, there are also independent reasons for why a relationship 
between depression and anti-natalism would be plausible and interesting. 
For example, it could be the case that one’s agreement with and acceptance 
of anti-natalism (whatever form that may take for the lay person) leads one 
to develop a more depressed outlook on life, perhaps because of the con-
tinued and wide-spread procreation of the human race and the accompany-
ing suffering created. Yet conversely and perhaps more plausibly, some 
evidence suggests that depressed individuals show a less substantial positive 
bias than non-depressed individuals (Moore & Fresco, 2012) and might, as 
such, be in fact more accurate in their evaluation of certain facts. On this line 
of reasoning, one might expect those higher in depression to perhaps more 
accurately (i.e., less over-optimistically) perceive reality and as such be more 
agreeable to anti-natalism under some evaluative precommitments.13 This 
study will investigate the relationship between depression and anti-natalism 
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(as well as the potentially mediating role that depression might play in 
relation to the first hypothesis) to shed some first light on this relationship. 
Null Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between depression levels and 
anti-natalist views.
Further, this study will also test the hypothesis that some of the relation-
ship between dark triad personality traits and anti-natalism might be driven 
by a higher level of risk aversion, as affirming the anti-natalist view might be 
a result of strong risk-aversion (bringing people into existence is risky; after 
all, one cannot ensure their wellbeing to a full extent).14 As such, this study 
will investigate the potentially mediating role of risk attitudes in regard to 
the first hypothesis. 
Null Hypothesis 3: Risk aversion is not a mediating factor in the relationship 
between dark triad personality traits and anti-natalist views.
Providing research on the relationship between anti-natalism and per-
sonality as well as depressive mood and risk aversion will further the 
literature on the psychosocial correlates of the dark triad personality traits. 
Drawing conclusions from these findings to the truth of anti-natalism is, of 
course, highly problematic. However, the data gathered in this study will at 
least illuminate the relationship between personality and anti-natalist views 
in a lay population, a finding that can have consequences for further 
philosophical theorizing and the development of a sound folk morality.
A follow-up replication study was conducted 2 months after the initial 
study. Its goal was to estimate the stability of the anti-natalism measure and 
the results more generally. That is, it aimed to analyze whether the main 
relationship found would replicate and whether there was a change in anti- 
natalist views overall. Importantly, the main study was conducted between 
February 27 and 28 February 2020 on a US sample. The follow-up study was 
conducted between 30 April 2020 and 9 May 2020 on the same sample. By 
this point, the United States had already recorded their first official death 
related to the COVID-19 pandemic on 29 February 2020, that is, just after 
the main study was conducted. By the time of the follow-up study, the 
majority of US states had entered periods of lockdown (of varying strin-
gency) and the news cycle was fully occupied with COVID-19 related 
coverage. It is important to point out that the main study was not conducted 
with the follow-up in mind, so the timing was entirely coincidental, and no 
individual identifiers were collected in the main study and as such no 
within-subject comparisons were possible. The main pre-registered ques-
tion was whether there would be a change in anti-natalist sentiment during 
a pandemic compared with before. 
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Null Hypothesis 4: There is no change in mean anti-natalist scores between 
the main study and the follow-up.
With the pandemic in full swing, and death numbers on everyone’s mind, 
one might think that one’s views on anti-natalism might be impacted. For 
example, seeing so much widespread suffering and illness might lead one to 
be more inclined to agree that bringing new life into existence is a morally 
bad thing. Specifically, one of the anti-natalism measures introduced later 
narrows down specifically on the bad future that prospective parents might 
leave for their children, a sentiment that the COVID-19 pandemic might 
have strengthened. Being able to potentially replicate the main relationship 
in question and to test whether general agreement with anti-natalist views is 
consistent across time allows for a more robust interpretation of the main 
results, especially as the anti-natalism items themselves had not been 
directly validated independently.
2. Methods
2.1 Participants and procedure
The final sample of this study was composed of 194 participants (59.3% 
male), aged 21–73 years (M = 34.41, SD = 10.564), who were paid US$0.30 
for the completion of this survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In 
the first part of the survey, participants were presented with measures on the 
dark triad, depression, and risk attitudes. In the second part, they responded 
to a number of philosophical thought experiments on utilitarian sacrificial 
dilemmas and were presented with arguments in favor of anti-natalism. If 
they failed to provide a minimally satisfactory answer to a qualitative com-
prehension question in which they were asked to quickly summarize what 
the previous argument or statement was about, they were eliminated from 
the study prior to data analysis. Eighty-two respondents were excluded from 
analysis via this mechanism (meaning the total number of responses col-
lected were 276, but all analyses were conducted with the 194 mentioned 
above unless specified explicitly).15 Ethics approval for this study was 
granted and the two studies were pre-registered on the Open-Science 
Framework.16,17
2.2 Measures
Dark Triad. In order to measure the dark triad personality traits, the Short 
Dark Triad (SD3) version SD3.1.1 was chosen (Jones & Paulhus, 2014; for 
validity cf. Maples et al., 2014). SD3.1.1 presents participants with nine 
items for each of the three traits, Machiavellianism, narcissism, and 
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psychopathy. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with those 
statements. These include “It’s wise to keep track of information that you 
can use against people later”, “People see me as a natural leader”, and “I 
enjoy having sex with people I hardly know” and were measured on a Likert 
scale from 1 to 5 (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). After reversal 
of reverse coded items, scores were added together in order to arrive at the 
respective personality index.
Depression. In order to measure depressive mood, the Zung Self-Rating 
Depression Scale (SDS) was chosen (Zung, 1986; for validity cf. Biggs et al., 
1978). It measures affective, psychological, and further bodily symptoms 
associated with depression by presenting participants with 20 self-report 
items (10 of which are reverse coded). Participants had to describe how 
often they have felt or behaved as described on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
to 4 (1 = A little of the time, 4 = Most of the time). After reversing the 
reverse coded items, a total score was derived by addition of all item scores 
(resulting in a total range from 20 to 80). According to the WHO, depres-
sion is typically associated with scores over 50 on this scale (2020).
Risk Aversion. Risk attitudes were estimated by adapting the approach by 
Eckel and Grossman (2008). Participants were presented with the choice 
between five gambles, all of which consist of two equiprobable outcomes (A 
and B) at 50% each. The outcomes of these five gambles represent different 
risk attitudes over hypothetical payoffs, with gamble 1 promising 10 USD 
irrespective of the outcome and gamble 5 paying out 42 USD in A and 
demanding a payment 6 USD (i.e., a payoff of -$6) in B. Specifically, the 
expected pay off increases by 2 USD with each gamble, as does the risk 
(defined as standard deviation of the payoff). Participants had to choose 
which one of those five gambles they would prefer in a hypothetical choice 
scenario. Mirroring the same structure, other-regarding risk attitudes were 
also measured by presenting participants with five similarly structured 
gambles over extra life years for a sick person.
Anti-Natalism. The central anti-natalism measure consisted of four argu-
ments or statements in favor of an anti-natalist conclusion. Four different 
items for anti-natalism were used, ranging from summaries of arguments to 
applied local cases of a much more restricted scope: Argument Anti- 
Natalism, summarizing Benatar’s asymmetry argument (Benatar, 2006, 
p. 30), Simple Anti-Natalism, consisting of a shorter version of the argu-
ment, Misanthropic Anti-Natalism, pointing to the harm that humans are 
doing (to other humans and the environment/animals), as well as Local 
Anti-Natalism, expressing the sentiment that parents who think their chil-
dren will have a miserable life should not procreate (cf. Cassidy, 2006; 
Shelby, 2016). For the specific wording of these items, see Appendix 1–  4. 
These items capture both the philosophical arguments of Benatar 
(Argument and Simple) as well as further statements that are shared by 
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a large number of anti-natalist positions (Local and Misanthropic). 
Participants were then asked to rate their agreement with these arguments 
on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = Disagree, 5 = Agree). In all individual 
items, higher scores indicate higher agreement with the anti-natalist point of 
view. To arrive at a total measure, all four individual scores were summed 
up. These scores are scores of agreement with the arguments and state-
ments, and are not scores of unintuitiveness of the conclusion. Participants 
who could not, in their own words, replicate one of the anti-natalist items in 
a qualitative comprehension question were excluded. 18
In order to mask the aim of the study, participants were also presented with 
some items drawn from Bartels and Pizarro (2011). Out of their 14 original 
items, 4 sacrificial dilemmas were randomly adopted. On those, participants 
had to decide whether they would sacrifice a person for the greater good, e.g., 
by pushing a man in front of a trolley. As in the original study, their answers 
were scored on a Likert scale ranging from −2 to 2 (−2 = No, 2 = Yes). Higher 
total scores indicate higher preference for the utilitarian solution.
2.3 Follow-up study methods
The final follow-up sample was composed of 99 US participants (50.5% 
male), aged 21–73 years (M = 37.78, SD = 11.715) drawn from the pool of 
participants in the main study. The main study had 276 participants, 194 
of which passed the comprehension checks. As such, this supplemental part 
of the study followed up on those 194 by advertising the study such that it 
was only visible to those who had successfully completed the main study and 
by sending two e-mail reminders. One hundred fifteen participants com-
pleted the follow-up survey. Of those, 16 were excluded prior to analysis on 
the basis of the same comprehension checks. As such, 99 participants’ data 
was analyzed in the follow-up study. The follow-up study employed the 
same measures as the main study. Participants were given the same survey 
(SD3.1.1, SDS, risk attitude measures, and anti-natalism measures). See 
above sections for details on both.
3. Results
While most studies in the literature consistently find men scoring higher on 
all three items than women, this study finds men showing only marginally 
significant higher scores on Machiavellianism (t(190) = 2.021, p = .045, 
d = .291) and unequivocally significant higher scores on psychopathy (t 
(191) = 3.690, p < .001, d = .541), but not on narcissism (t(189) = 1.169, 
p = .243, d = .170). However, controlling for gender did not affect the 
statistical significance effects reported in this paper (almost all significant 
p values remain significant at the same level19). The same was true for age, 
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i.e., controlling for age had no effect on any statistically significant effects 
reported in this paper either (almost all significant p values remain signifi-
cant at the same level20). As expected, all three dark triad items also had high 
internal consistency (Machiavellianism α = .886, narcissism α = .809, psy-
chopathy α = .870) and strong intercorrelations (r(189) = .551, p < .001 for 
Machiavellianism and narcissism, r(190) = .727, p < .001) for 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy, and r(189) = .557, p < .001 for psycho-
pathy and narcissism) (see Table 2).
On average, participants did not agree with anti-natalist arguments and 
statements on three out of the four items. Only Local Anti-Natalism showed 
light agreement at M = 3.20 (SD = 1.33) (see Table 1). Table 1 displays 
means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the four anti- 
natalism items. As hypothesized, all versions displayed high intercorrela-
tions, ranging from r(194) = .351, p < .001 between Local Anti-Natalism and 
Misanthropic Anti-Natalism to r(194) = .737, p < .001 between Simple Anti- 
Natalism and Argument Anti-Natalism. A reliability analysis was carried out 
on the four anti-natalism items, finding excellent internal consistency at 
α = .820. This suggests that the total anti-natalism score appropriately 
captures the underlying construct across all four items.
Testing Null Hypothesis 1, this data allows for the clear rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Participants who scored higher on the dark triad person-
ality traits (especially Machiavellianism and psychopathy) (SD3.1.1) showed 
greater inclination to anti-natalist views (Table 2). This held true for both 
Table 1. Mean, standard deviations, and correlations coefficients for the four items 
of anti-natalism.
Misanthropic Simple Argument Local
Misanthropic 1 - - -
Simple .604*** 1 - -
Argument .572*** .737*** 1 -
Local .351*** .475*** .432*** 1
M 2.93 2.52 2.52 3.20
SD 1.441 1.490 1.415 1.330
***p < .001
Table 2. Mean, standard deviations, and correlations between individual differences in person-
ality and anti-natalist views.
Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopathy Anti-Natalism
Machiavellianism 1 - - -
Narcissism .551*** 1 - -
Psychopathy .727*** .557*** 1 -
Anti-Natalism .490*** .293*** .621*** 1
Misanthropic .444*** .304*** .492*** .790***
Simple .456*** .321*** .590*** .881***
Argument .425*** .275*** .590*** .855***
Local .240*** .026 .313*** .689***
M 29.20 25.31 22.09 11.17
SD 7.824 6.981 8.223 4.578
***p < .001
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the aggregate anti-natalism scale, as well as all individual items except on the 
relationship between narcissism and Local Anti-Natalism (see Table 2), 
though the relationship between narcissism and any of the anti-natalist 
views was lower than compared with the other two traits across the board. 
Table 2 reports correlations between the dark triad personality traits and all 
four individual anti-natalism items as well as the total aggregate score.21 All 
dark triad traits explained a significant proportion of variance in anti- 
natalist views: Machiavellianism, R2 = .24, F(1, 190) = 60.04, p < .001; 
narcissism, R2 = .09, F(1, 189) = 17.74, p < .001; psychopathy, R2 = .39, F 
(1, 190) = 119.28, p < .001, though again narcissism explained the least.
Regarding Null Hypothesis 2, this data similarly allows for the rejection of 
the null hypothesis. Participants who scored higher on the Zung depression 
scale (SDS) expressed higher agreement with anti-natalist views at r 
(178) = .539, p < .001 (see Table 3). For Null Hypothesis 3, this data does 
not allow for a rejection of the null hypothesis. Neither self-regarding nor 
other-regarding risk aversion showed any relationship to participants’ 
endorsement of anti-natalist views, respectively (see Table 3).
Further, a mediation analysis of the effect of depression on the relationship 
between the dark triad personality traits on anti-natalist views was conducted. 
A non-parametric resampling procedure with 5000 bootstrap resamples was 
conducted. As reported before, the relationships between dark triad person-
ality traits and agreement with anti-natalist views, ignoring the mediator, were 
significant (see Table 2). Sobel tests were conducted, finding that mediation 








Depression 1 - - -
Self-regarding risk 
aversion
.035 1 - -
Other-regarding risk 
aversion
.086 .313*** 1 -
Anti-Natalism .539*** .104 .114 1
M 40.53 2.42 2.35 11.17
SD 11.110 1.380 1.411 4.578
***p < .001
Figure 1. Indirect effect of depression on the link between Machiavellianism and anti-natalist 
views, ***p < .001.
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effects for depression on anti-natalist views were significant for 
Machiavellianism (z = 2.759, p = .005) and psychopathy (z = 4.129, 
p < .001), but not for narcissism (z = .529, p = .596). See Figures 1, 2 and 3 
for the full mediation models. Neither self-regarding nor other-regarding risk- 
attitudes had a mediating role in any relationship.22
3.1 Follow-up study results
Total anti-natalism measures did not show a statistically significant change 
between the main study and the follow-up, though there does exist some 
heterogeneity within this aggregate (cf. Table 4).23 The t-tests are reported 
under the assumption of equal variances for Misanthropic Anti-Natalism 
and Local Anti-Natalism. For Simple Anti-Natalism, Argument Anti- 
Natalism, and the aggregate measure Anti-Natalism, Levene’s test indicated 
Figure 2. Indirect effect of depression on the link between narcissism and anti-natalist views, 
***p < .001.
Figure 3. Indirect effect of depression on the link between psychopathy and anti-natalist views, 
***p < .001.
Table 4. Mean, standard deviations, and t-tests for all individual and the aggregate anti- 
natalism measure before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Anti-Natalism Misanthropic Simple Argument Local
t 1.857 2.736 1.892 1.353 −.384
df 222 291 223 214 291
p (2-tailed) .065 .007** .060 .178 .701
d .226 .344 .229 .169 .047
Lower CI −.059 .136 −.013 −.012 −.377
Upper CI 1.985 .831 .650 .547 .254
M (SD) pre 11.17 (4.578) 2.93 (1.441) 2.52 (1.490) 2.52 (1.415) 3.20 (1.330)
M (SD) post 10.20 (3.992) 2.44 (1.409) 2.20 (1.293) 2.29 (1.288) 3.26 (1.234)
**p < .01
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that equal variances cannot be assumed (with F = .17.389, p < .001, 
F = 4.049, p = .045, and F = 4.491, p = .035 respectively), so the degrees of 
freedom were adjusted accordingly.
Participants in the follow-up study showed slightly higher Machiavellianism 
scores, t(289) = 2.112, p = .036, d = .258, and slightly lower psychopathy scores, 
t(225) = 2.516, p = .013, d = .304, with no significant differences on narcissism 
scores, t(288) = 1.921, p = .056, d = .238. The relationships between the dark 
triad personality traits Machiavellianism and psychopathy and anti-natalist 
views remained strong in the follow-up study (cf. Table 5). However, the 
relationship between narcissism and anti-natalism, which was present but 
comparably weak in the main study and dropped out of both the relationship 
generally and the mediation models with depression, disappeared in this 
replication (cf. Table 5, Figure 4). With narcissism dropping out of the picture, 
it is no longer the case that all dark triad traits explained a statistically 
significant proportion of variance in anti-natalist views: Machiavellianism, 
R2 = .22, F(1, 97) = 27.69, p < .001; narcissism, R2 = .00, F(1, 97) = 0.00, 
p = .994; psychopathy, R2 = .25, F(1, 97) = 32.134, p < .001. As before, 
Table 5. Mean, standard deviations, and correlations between individual differences in person-
ality and anti-natalist views in the follow-up study.
Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopathy Anti-Natalism
Machiavellianism 1 - - -
Narcissism .429*** 1 - -
Psychopathy .690*** .434*** 1 -
Anti-Natalism .471*** −.001 .499*** 1
Misanthropic .456*** .050 .437*** .819***
Simple .358*** −.019 .449*** .871***
Argument .339*** −.046 .377*** .806***
Local .275** .009 .251** .546***
M 27.12 23.65 19.75 10.20
SD 8.177 6.996 7.102 3.992
**p < .01 
ap < .001
Figure 4. Scatter plots and linear model fits for dark triad personality traits (from the left: 
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and anti-natalist views in main study (top row) 
and follow-up study (bottom row).
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controlling for gender and age did not impact the results (all p values remain at 
their level, i.e., all p < .001 remain at p < .001).
4. Discussion
This study aimed at empirically investigating a potential relationship of dark 
triad personality traits and views concerning the ethics of procreation, 
specifically anti-natalism. The data allow for the broad conclusion that 
there exists a strong relationship between endorsement of anti-natalist 
views and dark triad personality traits, especially for Machiavellianism 
(r = .490) and psychopathy (r = .621), less so for narcissism. Moreover, 
the follow-up study allowed for a replication of this general result, further 
strengthening the evidentiary basis for these findings. Further, the presence 
of a mediating role of depression in the relationships between 
Machiavellianism/psychopathy and anti-natalist views sheds further light 
on the findings while also making further plausible the claim that narcissism 
does not play a substantive role in this association. We take these findings to 
suggest a picture in which lay anti-natalist views stand in a significant 
relationship to dark triad personality traits and depressive mood.
Concerning the null hypotheses outlined earlier, for the main study, Null 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 could be rejected soundly (cf. Table 2; Table 3), as dark 
triad personality traits and depression were found to be standing in 
a remarkably strong positive relationship with agreement with anti- 
natalism while playing a mediating role in the main relationships. Null 
Hypothesis 3 could not be rejected (cf. Table 3), as both self-regarding and 
other-regarding risk-aversion did not stand in a relationship to either the 
anti-natalist aggregate measure or any individual items and also played no 
mediating role.
Overall, these findings present evidence that variation in lay agreement 
with anti-natalist views that procreation is morally wrong is, at least in part, 
explained by individual differences in personality and depressive mood. One 
main finding is that Machiavellianism and psychopathy stand in a strong 
relationship that is robust even in the follow-up, further strengthening the 
evidentiary basis for this claim. Narcissism’s relationship, however, both 
does not replicate in the follow-up and is not mediated by depressive scores, 
further indicating that narcissism falls outside the realm of explanatory 
capabilities of the picture proposed here and may be best explained by 
a different set of hypotheses and factors. This suggests that the picture is 
one of a ‘dark dyad’, i.e., of Machiavellianism and psychopathy, that explains 
a good deal of variation in anti-natalist views in a lay population respec-
tively. This is consistent with a set of recent findings that suggest more 
generally that narcissism and the ‘dark dyad’ (i.e. Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy) are indeed two distinct constructs (Rogoza & Cieciuch, 2020).
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The fact that narcissism only shows a weak or non-existent relationship 
suggests that the relevant personality features of Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy, for example, their tendency to low empathy and cynicism 
toward common-sense morality as well as reduced ability to feel pleasure 
(Treadway & Zald, 2011), are most closely associated with anti-natalist 
views and must thus play a part in the explanation as opposed to any 
factettes of narcissism. On this line of thinking, depression fits into this 
picture by drawing on depressive individuals’ devaluation of life and bleak 
outlook on the future. In other words, the results here suggest that those 
scoring high on Machiavellianism and psychopathy as well as depression 
(which mediates the main relationship), are more likely to feel negatively 
about life, common moral standards, and others more generally. That is, one 
is more likely to agree with the anti-natalist arguments that procreation is 
a moral wrong because of one’s own propensity to disvalue life, be it present 
or future.,24,25
As such, the role of depression is also crucial to understanding the present 
data. This is because the higher one scores on the depression scale, the more 
likely one might be to regard one’s own life as not worth living, possibly 
extending this sentiment and overgeneralizing to the claim that lives gen-
erally are not worth living and that bringing new lives into existence is 
a moral wrong because of this. Generally, however, there are two types of 
explanations about how the impact of depression might intersect with views 
about anti-natalism. First, one may refer to depressive realism, i.e., the claim 
that depressed individuals better perceive reality (Moore & Fresco, 2012) 
and are thus better equipped to judge the anti-natalist arguments. 
Conversely, one might also think that depressed individuals’ thinking inha-
bits certain flaws, making them liable to underestimate the goodness and 
value of life. This would be consistent with a rationalization explanation: 
One’s affect directly influences what one believes about the world, e.g., about 
the value of a life. The present data do not allow for a disambiguation 
between the depressive realist interpretation from the rationalization 
claim and further research is needed to shed light on this specific question.
The follow-up replication study aimed at testing whether the same 
pattern of results could be replicated and whether the pandemic overall 
influenced views on anti-natalism. Null Hypothesis 4 could not be rejected, 
as the follow-up found that there was no significantly higher or lower 
aggregate agreement with anti-natalist arguments and statements. Both on 
aggregate measures and on the majority of individual measures, participants 
reported insignificantly different agreement. Only on the topic of 
Misanthropic Anti-Natalism did participants show a change, however their 
agreement with this formulation of anti-natalism was reduced (contra the 
expected directionality of an increase). Specifically, they reported lower 
agreement with the claim that because humans cause such a substantial 
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amount of harm to other humans, animals, and the environment, that it is 
wrong to procreate.
The data from the follow-up study also showed that the relationship 
between narcissism and anti-natalism weakened significantly, from a small 
to moderate effect in the main study, r = .293, p < .001, to virtually no 
relationship at all, r = −.001, p = .994. The relationships for 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy remained at moderate to strong levels. 
As such, this follow-up study shows that the results that Machiavellianism 
and psychopathy stand in a strong relationship to anti-natalism are robust. 
It also ought to diminish our certainty in the claim that narcissism is part of 
the picture in such a way that, given these data, one ought to be highly 
skeptical as to whether narcissism plays any role in any relationship to anti- 
natalism at all, which is in line with those arguing for the dark dyad and 
narcissism being distinct constructs (Rogoza & Cieciuch, 2020).
Overall, these findings strengthen the claim that at least some dark triad 
personality traits stand in remarkably strong relationships to anti-natalist 
views. Some potential reasons for this change in results from the main 
sstudy to the follow-up is non-random attrition, in that the follow-up 
sample was not a random draw from the initial sample. Irrespective of the 
actual reason, we take this follow-up to increase the evidentiary status of the 
findings that Machiavellianism and psychopathy strand in a strong relation-
ship to anti-natalist views. Recall also that narcissism already showed the 
weakest association, and taken together with the follow-up, one might want 
to explicitly exclude it from any full picture going forward. Further, given 
that depression played an important mediating the main relationships, the 
fact that the follow-up did not find an effect for narcissism is further 
compatible with previous research that found that comorbidities of depres-
sion and dark triad traits are typically only found with regard to 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy, not narcissism (Gómez-Leal et al., 
2019) and again suggests that the picture is one of the dark dyad being 
associated with anti-natalist views. As such, the data gathered in the follow- 
up make the overall picture more consistent with previous findings and may 
thus increase the plausibility of the findings.
The main interpretative challenge of the data gathered in this paper 
relevant to philosophical theorizing and broad understanding of the public 
discourse on the topic is this: Does the observed relationship between dark 
triad personality traits/depression and anti-natalism give us reason to 
reduce or increase our credence in anti-natalism? For one, one might 
think that higher psychopathy scores and the presence of (mild) depression 
might give one reason to doubt the judgments about anti-natalism made by 
the lay population. After all, is it rational to rely on the judgments of 
individuals whose personality profile differs substantially from the norm 
and who are more depressed than the mean person? Specifically, the 
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Machiavellian (but also the psychopathic) personality trait is often asso-
ciated with emotional detachment in those who also suffer from depression 
(Demenescu et al., 2010) as well as an inability to feel pleasure in some 
contexts (Gómez-Leal et al., 2019, p. 10; Cairncross et al., 2013). This would 
give one reason to believe that the lay evaluation of the quality-of-life 
argument central to Benatar’s formulation of anti-natalism (2006) might 
be subject to individual variation if these come with emotional detachment 
and the inability to feel pleasure. After all, emotional attachment and the 
ability to feel pleasure are central to our evaluation of life as good and as 
such tie directly into Benatar’s quality of life argument.26
Conversely, one might also think that depression and its hypothesized 
more realistic outlook on life and the disregard for common-sense morality 
present in dark triad personality traits might lead to the reverse conclusion, 
i.e., that because of the presence of this relationship, one ought to have 
higher credence in the truth of anti-natalism.27 However, the evidence that 
depression does indeed lead to a more realistic outlook on life is relatively 
restricted in methodological scope28 and generally shows relatively small 
effect sizes (Moore & Fresco, 2012, p. 505).29 Moreover, there is the addi-
tional challenge of evaluating a realist effect on purely evaluative topics such 
as anti-natalism. Given that no objective baseline can be established here 
(under plausible assumptions), we claim that one ought not be overly 
confident in the line of depressive realist argumentation with regard to anti- 
natalism and depressive mood.
For the purposes of this paper, we will not decisively argue one way or 
another. This is because the data presented here are the first in this line of 
research and can only explain a part of the picture. Further, arguing either 
way presupposes assuming a number of propositions that we are not pre-
pared or able to make in a paper with this scope, eg., whether anti-natalist 
views are the type of views that depressed individuals or those high on dark 
triad personality traits are especially well or especially poorly equipped to 
judge. However, given the data obtained and the background literature 
referred to above, one might be more inclined to favor the former inter-
pretative claim, i.e., that those high on dark triad personality traits and 
depression are less well-equipped to judge the truth of arguments about 
anti-natalism. In order to confidently answer those questions as well as 
further interpretative challenges, e.g., concerning the role of empathy in 
this relationship, however, more research has to be conducted. Specifically, 
further research should include a general expansion of the present data base 
on the psychosocial correlates of anti-natalist views, as well as a scientific 
analysis of expert populations such as professional philosophers. However, 
the data present here may be taken as indicative of moral reasoning in public 
discourse on anti- 
natalism as it does explain variations in lay views on anti-natalism.
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Overall, we take the main philosophical value of these studies to be that 
they add to the literature on the relationship between personality traits and 
moral judgments as well as philosophical intuitions more broadly. It has 
been a goal of experimental philosophy generally to establish an empiri-
cally informed picture of folk morality, and the present data directly add 
to this project. In the same way that, for example, research on the role of 
culture, demographics, and reflection on lay philosophical judgments 
generally has contributed to the philosophical enterprise of identifying 
some of the sources and mechanisms which may drive certain judgments, 
this may also hold for questions relating to anti-natalism. We draw the 
tentative conclusions that the data present here, coupled with additional 
novel studies on additional populations, might go some way to provide 
a philosophically interesting picture of anti-natalist views that can then 
lead to an increase or reduction of our credence in anti-natalism. As 
outlined before, we believe that due to the high importance of figuring 
out whether anti-natalism is true or not, continuing this research (either 
by conducting further studies or by expanding the arguments relating to 
what we ought to draw from the data collected) is incredibly important 
under the possibility of humanity’s long potential future and the resultant 
significant moral risk.
4.1 Limitations
This study relied exclusively on an online sample of US residents drawn from 
MTurk. As such, cross-cultural conclusions should not be drawn lightly and 
any associations found here may be the artifact of cultural-linguistic circum-
stances. Moreover, the consistently strong intercorrelations between anti- 
natalism and dark dyad personality traits might also point toward the fact 
that both scales measure a similar underlying factor, such as a disaffirmation 
of life. However, this is both a potential problem and a possible upside. On the 
one hand, this might mean that the finding does not properly represent the 
relationship between two independent concepts, but rather measures close-
ness of related concepts. On the other hand, though, because anti-natalist 
views have not yet been associated with dark triad traits, even if this was true, 
the findings presented here would still represent novel empirical insight into 
the study of personality and folk moral judgment and may directly lead to 
further research projects.
The main limitation of the follow-up is nonrandom attrition. As this follow- 
up study was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems plausible 
that the follow-up sample was not a sample randomly drawn from the previous 
population, but rather that the attrition rate might be connected to the 
experiences during the pandemic. For example, those hardest hit by the 
pandemic might not have had the time and energy to participate in an online 
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study. As such, the results of the follow-up concerning the impact of the 
pandemic ought to be taken into account with a certain level of caution, though 
the purely replicatory function of the follow-up may be immune from this 
limitation to a certain degree. Further, because the follow-up was not planned 
at the time of the first study, no individual identifiers were collected that would 
have enabled proper within-subject analyses between the main study and the 
follow-up, further weakening the evidentiary status of the follow-up.
5. Conclusion
This study provided novel research into the relationship of anti-natalist 
views of a lay population and dark triad personality traits. The data estab-
lished a strong association between the two, especially between the dark 
dyad traits of Machiavellianism/psychopathy and anti-natalism. Further, the 
mediating role of depression in the relationships between Machiavellianism 
and psychopathy (but not narcissism) and anti-natalist views strengthened 
the picture that folk anti-natalist views are partly explained by individual 
differences in personality and depressive mood. Overall, the results do not 
lend themselves to a single interpretative story as to the truth of anti- 
natalism. However, the impact of personality and mood on moral judg-
ments raises a number of questions for further research both connected to 
anti-natalism and moral judgments more generally. For example, what 
other personality features can also explain variation in endorsement of anti- 
natalist views, how does empathy play into any fuller account of lay anti- 
natalist views, how many potential explanatory pathways there are, and how 
do these results generalize to lay judgments of moral arguments overall and 
to the judgments of professional philosopher populations. We hope that 
future research will build upon this first empirical account and expand this 
research.
Notes
1. For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Theron Pummer, Ben Grodeck, 
Simon Graf, Lara Jost, Raimund Pils, Ravi Thakral, Tomi Francis, Johannes Wagner, 
Eric Neumann, and Philipp Berghofer.
2. Arguing from both within and outside the analytic tradition, Cabrera (2018) con-
siders the “primary ethical question” (Cabrera, 2018, pp. 118, 118), namely that of 
procreation. They claim that procreation is an action for the good of the parents and 
not the child that gets thrown into an existence that, based on their moral impediment 
thesis, is necessarily structured such that at least the interests and welfare of someone 
will have to be harmed (Cabrera, 2018, pp. 60–61, 60–61). They conclude that because 
of this, and because procreation violates the ‘no harm demand’ as well as the ‘do not 
manipulate’ principles, both prima facie plausible principles of ethics, procreation is 
morally unjustified.
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3. From a feminist perspective, Overall (2012) claims that the burden of proof ought to 
be on those who choose to have children, while acknowledging the outsized impact 
that this choice has on women.
4. For an argument similar to that of Benatar (2020), see Rachels (2014), who similarly 
focuses on improving the lives of those already alive. For an extension of this 
argument to the topic of shelter (and the lack thereof), see Friedrich (2013).
5. For an early formulation of some version of anti-natalism in Mill’s On Liberty, 
consider the following passage: “It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child 
into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its 
body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the 
unfortunate offspring and against society” (Mill, 1892, pp. 62, 62).
6. For example, Brown (2011) titles their critique of Benatar’s ‘Better Never to Have 
Been” (Benatar, 2006) cynically ‘Better Never to Have Been Believed’ (Brown, 2011).
7. Though note that it may be the case that those that score high on some personality 
traits are more likely to hold anti-natalist views because of their personality, or that 
their independently reached anti-natalist views impact their personality.
8. While this is a plausible and interesting hypothesis, it will not be tested directly in this 
paper. The results presented here only provide indirect evidence as those higher on 
dark triad traits are typically lower on empathy, though as this was not the aim of this 
study, no direct conclusions as to this hypothesis ought to be drawn.
9. Further to this definition of (grandiose) narcissism, there also exists the vulnerable 
type. In all further mentions of narcissism, I intend to refer to both of them, even 
though the examples given might only properly belong to one or the other.
10. Especially if this relationship is, at least in part, genetically mediated as has been 
suggested (cf. Campbell et al., 2009).
11. For cognitive empathy, only Machiavellianism predicts it negatively and narcissism 
predicts it positively (cf. Pajevic et al., 2018).
12. It is worth nothing, however, that the further hypothesis that increased empathy 
ought to stand in a positive relation to agreement with anti-natalist views is plausible 
as well (as high empathy might make the suffering and loss of life even more 
protruding). This question will not be answered in the study at hand, though it may 
provide valuable ground for further scientific inquiry.
13. This line of interpretation, however, faces the challenge of presupposing that reality is 
indeed worse than commonly perceived. Further, depressed individuals have been 
found to be especially likely to recall evaluative scenarios as more negative than they 
actually were (cf. Gotlib, 1983; cf. also Burt et al., 1995), though these examples cannot 
be easily generalized to anti-natalism due to the lack of an objective baseline. For 
additional research on how those high on cynicism do on similar tasks, cf. Stavrova 
and Ehlebracht (2019).
14. See Weinberg (2016) for an account alongside this line of thinking.
15. A higher sample size would have been beneficial for research into a relatively unex-
plored domain, making the high exclusions especially unfortunate. In the results 
section, we also report the main findings without any exclusions.
16. UTREC approval code: SA14775.
17. OSF preregistration: https://osf.io/pj5wt/.
18. Though even a comprehension question cannot fully assure that all participants 
judged the merit of the arguments as opposed to merely the (un-) intuitiveness of 
the conclusion, we take this to go a long way toward achieving that.
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19. Exception: The relationship between self-regarding risk aversion and other-regarding 
risk aversion, once controlled for gender, decreases from r(178) = .313, p < .001 to r 
(178) = .253, p = .001.
20. Exceptions: The relationship between Machiavellianism and local anti-natalism, once 
controlled for age, decreases from r(192) = .240, p < .001 to r(192) = .165, p = .030. 
Further, the relationship between psychopathy and local anti-natalism also decreased 
from r(190) = .313, p < .001 to r(190) = .213, p = .005.
21. If there is any concern about the tentatively high exclusion rate, we re-ran the analyses 
without any exclusions, replicating the effects reported. The anti-natalist composite 
measure stood in a strong relationship to Machiavellianism scores, r(272) = .504, 
p < .001, narcissism, scores r(269) = .470, p < .001, and psychopathy scores, r 
(270) = .666, p < .001.
22. Lastly, this study also replicated the effect reported by Bartels and Pizarro (2011) that 
dark triad personality traits predict endorsement of sacrificial utilitarian solutions in 
moral dilemmas. All three dark triad personality traits showed an association with 
utilitarian choices, with narcissism (r(190) = .180, p = .013) showing the weakest, and 
Machiavellianism (r(191) = .402, p < .001) and psychopathy (r(191) = .469, p < .001) 
both showing stronger associations. Moreover, the data also reveal a moderate asso-
ciation between an inclination toward sacrificial dilemma solutions and agreement 
with anti-natalist views (r(193) = .396, p < .001).
23. As the alpha level of significance was pre-registered at 5%, all p values above 0.05 are 
treated as unequivocally non-significant, including those at .060 and .065.
24. An important further point in favor of this line of argument is that narcissism stands 
in a much weaker (main study) or non-existent (follow-up study) relationship to anti- 
natalist views. If the above explanation does not suffice, this is perhaps best explained 
by the possibility that those higher on narcissism might be more likely to read the 
anti-natalism items as about them specifically as opposed to claims about the general 
moral permissibility of procreation.
25. Importantly, this is in line with previous findings on the comorbidity of depression 
and dark triad personality traits which found a strong and unambiguous relationship 
of depression only with Machiavellianism and psychopathy, not narcissism, (Gómez- 
Leal et al., 2019).
26. Generally, there is also the rationalization approach that differs slightly from the 
potential interpretations discussed above. On this view, mood and personality is prior 
such that individuals with a certain type of mood (e.g. depression) or personality 
construe beliefs that fit the former. For example, if one is suffering from depression, 
one might be inclined to believe propositions that fit this mood, i.e. that life is not 
worth living and that one should not bring further life into this world. The data 
presented here do now allow for a verdict on this view one way or another.
27. Further, there is the additional methodological worry that certain type of persons may 
interpret the arguments and statements differently. For example, a serial killer like 
Richard Ramirez might claim that life is suffering, but that because of this everything 
is permitted. However, such a person might also agree with the anti-natalist argu-
ments presented in this study, thus complicating the interpretation of the data. Yet, 
we claim that individual variation in the reasons for agreeing with anti-natalist 
arguments is not prima facie problematic, as all analyses conducted here, and all 
effects found are of aggregates. Given the very strong relationships found, and the 
assumed high heterogeneity in participants (along many dimensions), we claim that 
the fact that some individuals might have differing reasons for agreeing or disagreeing 
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with anti-natalist arguments is not especially troubling. We thank an anonymous 
referee for pressing this point.
28. For example, a large number of studies purporting to show this effect rely on 
contingency tasks, in which participants’ judgment of a mechanism between a light 
and a button are shown to be less prone to biases found in non-depressed individuals 
(Alloy et al., 1985). Whether and how this generalizes to issues of relevance here 
remains an open question.
29. However, some research has suggested that depressive realism is an effect largely 
found in mildly depressed individuals (cf. Dennard & Hokanson, 1986; Loewenstein 
& Hokanson, 1986). Given the fact that the participants in this study only exhibited 
mild depression, this may give further counteracting weight to this line of reasoning.
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